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EQUITABLE JURISDICTION TO ORDER
STERILIZATIONS
The nonconsensual sterilization of incompetent persons, like abortion
and contraception, presents legal and ethical issues difficult enough to
resolve in the abstract precincts of an individual conscience. These difficulties are only magnified 'when presented in the concrete reality of a
courtroom. Nonetheless, courts have been dealing with statutorily authorized nonconsensual sterilizations for over a half century.' Recently,
courts have begun to explore new judicial ground, asserting equitable jurisdiction to order nonconsensual sterilization of retarded persons where,
after applying strict standards, the court is convinced that the welfare of
2
the retarded person would be furthered.
Part I of this comment examines the historical development of nonconsensual sterilization and contrasts the earlier statutory schemes with modem equitable principles. Part II examines both sides of the question
whether authority to order nonconsensual sterilizations should be inferred
from a general jurisdictional grant. Part III concludes that courts of general jurisdiction should have such authority, but that its assertion is proper
only if it is based on as narrow a rationale as possible, if its exercise
furthers the rights of the retarded person, and if its application is strictly
circumscribed by standards consistent with its equitable nature.
I.

STERILIZATION OF MENTALLY HANDICAPPED
PERSONS

There are two recognized theoretical justifications for the sterilization
of incompetent persons. The more notorious is based on eugenic theory,
which supports a widespread sterilization policy aimed at improving the
societal gene pool. Generally, eugenic theory has been implemented
through statutes authorizing sterilization of mental incompetents. 3 In contrast is the more narrow equitable justification based upon the welfare of
the person whose sterilization is sought rather than society's interest in
having that person sterilized. This justification is usually exemplified by

i. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (eugenic statute held constitutional); State v.
Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75 (1912) (sterilization as punishment for crime not cruel and unusual).
2. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re A.W., ... _Colo.__ , 637 P.2d 366
(1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635
(1980); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981). But see Hudson v. Hudson, 373
So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1981).
3. See note 6 infra.
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cases in which courts order nonconsensual sterilization under their equitable powers.
A.

Eugenic Sterilization

Theories of genetic selection historically have enjoyed some support
among social theorists. 4 Within the last century, the emerging science of
genetics lent an empirical focus to these theories. 5 The simultaneous development of modern surgical sterilization techniques resulted in legislative enactments implementing eugenic theory. 6 The new statutes codified
the unexamined assumptions and prejudicial ignorance implicit in this
"new" theory of eugenics, and broadly authorized the sterilization of
amorphously defined classes of persons, including the "feeble minded"
7
and "moral[ly] degenerate."
4. The idea of eugenics is as old as Western civilization. Plato said:
[Tlhere is a need for the best men to have intercourse as often as possible with the best women.
and the reverse for the most ordinary men with the most ordinary women: and the offspring of
the former must be reared but not that of the others, if the flock is going to be of the most
eminent quality.
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 138 (Bloom trans. 1968).
5. The modem theory of eugenics was pioneered by Sir Francis Galton, whose seminal work.
Inquiries into Hunan Faculty, was published in 1883. Galion's emphasis, however, was on "positive" eugenics, which seeks to promote what are considered to be desirable traits. See Vukowich.
The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL.
L.F. 189 (1971). It remained for pragmatic theorists to place the emphasis on the negative aspects of
eugenic theory. See, e.g., Humphrey, The Menace of the Half-Man, II1 J. HEREDITY 228 (1920).
6. At one time, at least 25 states had statutes aimed at the eugenic sterilization of persons deemed
mentally defective. Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DEN. L.J. 631. 633
(1969). After a flurry of repeals in the last decade, only II states retain statutes that are eugenically
based. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-501, 502 (1971): DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1974):
GA. CODE ANN. § 84-931 to 84-936 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 34, § 2461-2468 (1964).
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to 41-45-19 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to 35-50 (1976 &
supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, 88 341-346 (West 1979): OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.010.150 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1 to 64-10-13 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 88
8701-8704 (1968); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1 to 27-16-5 (1980). Some of these, notably those of
Oregon, North Carolina, and Utah, have been revised, seemingly to withstand constitutional attack.
See notes 15-17 and accompanying text infra.
7. The statute enacted in Washington applied to "all feeble minded, insane, epileptic, habitual
criminals, moral degenerates and sexual perverts." Act of March 8, 1921, ch. 53, § 1, 1921 Wash.
Laws 162-63. None of these terms were further defined. This statute was held to violate procedural
due process in In re Hendrickson, 12 Wn. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942). The legislative embodiment
of eugenic theory was carried to its logical extreme in Nazi Germany. The Nazis advanced the process by the establishment of the Hereditary Health Courts. Originally limited in a manner similar to
the American statutes, the German versions were eventually expanded to include persons with cleft
palates or severe hearing impairments. By 1937, 225,000 persons had been sterilized by the Nazi
regime. In 1941. deeming sterilization a temporary solution, Hitler authorized concentration camps
and extermination for persons deemed inferior. The law was compulsory for the mentally impaired.
Brief of The National Center for Law and the Handicapped, Inc. Amicus Curiae at 7-14, Stump v.
Sparkman. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

Sterilization of Incompetent Persons
The United States Supreme Court approved the substantive constitutionality of one such statute in 1927 in Buck v. Bell.8 At issue in Buck was
the validity of a Virginia statute authorizing the sterilization of persons in
state institutions who were suffering from hereditary forms of retardation.
The avowed purpose of the statute was to allow the release of persons,
after sterilization, who would be a "menace" if released with their reproductive capabilities intact. 9 The Court cited the Virginia legislature's recital that "experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the
transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc.," 1 0 and held that this expression
of eugenic theory provided a rational basis for the statute. 1I
Since Buck v. Bell, eugenic theory has come under attack. First, modem genetic science simply does not support broad generalizations regarding the hereditary nature of mental deficiency. On the contrary, modem
studies show that many forms of mental retardation are not inherited, and
that many which are inheritable cannot be controlled with sterilization
because they are not manifest in the parents. 12 Recent studies also deny
the validity of assumptions, implicit in a eugenic theory, about the promiscuous nature of the mentally retarded and the lack of emotional damage
from their sterilization. 13 Perhaps the most cogent criticism, however,
points out that a widespread policy of sterilization will unavoidably include persons who later overcome their "congenital" incompetence. 14
The extent to which Buck v. Bell allows states to sterilize individuals
without any concern for the right of those individuals, whatever their
mental condition, to be free from state-mandated bodily invasion and termination of their right to procreate shocks the modem conscience. The
most disturbing aspect of Buck v. Bell and the history of statutory eugenic
8. 274 U.S. 200(1927).
9. Id. at 205-06.
10. Id. at 206. Such a determination might invoke a different constitutional standard of review
today than it did in 1927. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text infra.
11. 274 U.S. at 207. Justice Holmes left no doubt about his acceptance of eugenic theory:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to
let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Id. It appears, however, that the third generation imbecile was actually of normal intelligence. Coogan, Eugenic Sterilization Holds Jubilee,. 177 CATH. WORLD 44, 46 (1953). One wonders if the
statistical validity of Justice Holmes' conclusion is diminished by such a drastic reduction in the size
of his sample population.
12. Cook, Eugenics or Euthenics?, 37 ILL. L. REv. 287 (1943); Murdock, Sterilization of the
Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 917, 924-26 (1974); Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DEN. L.J. 631, 642-44 (1969).
13. E.g., J. ROBrrSCHER, EuGENiC STERILIZATION 19-22 (1973). Robitscher suggests that the
mentally retarded are capable of adherence to stringent standards of social conduct.
14. Id.
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sterilization is the implementation of a questionable social policy at the
expense of individual rights. In the context of a eugenic sterilization statute, the issue is a clear and simple balance between the rights of an individual and the interest of the state in that individual's sterilization.
Eugenic sterilization statutes represent a legislative decision resolving
this balance in favor of the state. Buck v. Bell is rightly subject to criticism for its blind concurrence in that legislative determination.
The development of modem constitutional principles and the erosion of
the precarious empirical basis for eugenic statutes has cast doubt upon the
continuing constitutionality of eugenic-based sterilization statutes. Under
modem constitutional standards, the right to freedom of choice in decisions about procreation has been held to be a fundamental individual right
and within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy. ' 5 The infringement of a fundamental right by a state statute triggers strict scrutiny.
thereby requiring any abridgement by a state of such a right to be in
furtherance of a compelling state interest. 16 The abridgement must also be
narrowly drawn to conform to that compelling state interest. 1 7 This
"compelling state interest" standard, which would be applied to eugenicbased sterilization statutes today, is far more stringent than the "rational
basis" standard applied in Buck v. Bell and would likely lead to an opposite result, especially in light of the diminishing empirical foundation for
eugenic theory.
B.

EquitablyJustified Sterilization

In stark contrast to the social engineering rationale of eugenic theory
are judicial assertions of inherent jurisdiction, absent specific statutory
grant, to authorize nonconsensual sterilization under equitable principles.
The key distinction between eugenic and equitable sterilization is the emphasis in the latter on the welfare of the individual before the court rather
than on society's interest in having that individual sterilized.
Courts that recognize equitable jurisdiction to order nonconsensual
sterilization base their authority upon the general grant of equitable pow-

15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion), Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(contraception): Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception): Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization of habitual criminal). See generally Comment. Eugenic
Sterilization Statutes: A ConstitutionalRe-evaluation, 14 J. FAM. L. 280, 295- 303 (1975).

16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Shapiro v.Thompson. 394 U.S 618. 634 (1969):
see Comment. supra note 15. at 295- 303.
17. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville. 422 U.S. 205. 216 (1975): Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113.
155 (1973); Zwickler v. Koota. 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967): see Comment. supra note 15. at
295-303.

Sterilization of Incompetent Persons
ers given to them by their state constitution 18 or statutes. 19 Not all courts,
however, agree that their equitable powers stretch so far. 20 Courts claiming that sterilization authority is within their equitable powers point to the
doctrine of parens patriae developed from the historical jurisdiction of
chancery courts over the persons and estates of the incompetent and insane. 2 1 The chancery courts essentially exercised for those individuals
that discretion which, due to their condition, they could not exercise for
22

themselves.
The two leading examples of courts asserting equitable power over
nonconsensual sterilizations are the Washington Supreme Court's decision in In re Hayes23 and the New Jersey Supreme Court's decison in In

re Grady.24 Both the Washington and New Jersey Supreme Courts set
forth stringent standards 25 that should be met before a court exercises its
26
equitable jurisdiction to order a nonconsensual sterilization.

18. E.g., In re Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d 228,234,608 P.2d 635,637 (1980).
19. E.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 609 n.5 (Alaska 1981) (basing equitable jurisdiction on
both constitutional and statutory grounds).
20. E.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1981); In re Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698,
146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974).
21. E.g., It re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467, 479 (1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d 228,
233,608 P.2d 635 (1980).
22. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 611 (Alaska 1981); in re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d
(1978).
467,479(1981); 67A C.J.S. ParensPatriae
23. 93 Wn. 2d 228,608 P.2d 635 (1980).
24. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). See generally Note, Court of Equity Has InherentPower
to Exercise Mentally Retarded Individual'sRight to Sterilization, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 96 (198 1)
(Grady noted).
25. The standards enunciated by both can be summarized as follows:
1) The mentally retarded person must be represented by a guardian ad litem;
2) The court must consider independent advice based on a comprehensive medical, psychological, and social evaluation of the individual, especially considering the probable impact of
pregnancy;
3) To the greatest extent possible, the court must elicit and take into account the view of the
mentally retarded person.
See Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d at 481-83; Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d at 234-40, 608 P.2d at 639-42
(plurality opinion). Once these are accomplished, the petitioning party must show by clear and convincing evidence that:
1) The individual is incapable of making her own decision about sterilization, and is unlikely
to develop that capacity in the future;
2) The individual is capable of reproduction and likely to engage in sexual activity in the near
future;
3) The individual is permanently incapable of caring for a child;
4) All less drastic contraceptive methods are unworkable;
5) The proposed method of sterilization entails the least possible bodily invasion.
See Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d at 481-83; Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d at 234-40, 608 P.2d at 639-42
(plurality opinion). See generally Comment, NonconsensualSterilizationof the Mentally RetardedAnalysis of Standardsfor Judicial Determinations, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 689 (1981) (detailed
treatment of the standards).
26. Of these two, only the Grady court adopted these standards as effective law. 85 N.J. 235,
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Constitutional requirements and the absence of statutory guidelines
make these standards necessary. 27 Some courts, however, refuse to sanction the exercise of this equitable jurisdiction in the absence of legislatively determined standards. 28 This sort of controversy is, of course, absent in eugenic sterilization cases where standards, such as they are,2 9 are

provided by the legislature.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE COURTS' EQUITABLE
JURISDICTION

Authority is divided on whether a general grant of equitable jurisdiction encompasses the power to order nonconsensual sterilizations in the
absence of a sterilization statute. Prior to 1978, no court had held that a
grant of general equitable jurisdiction enabled it to authorize nonconsensual sterilizations. Since then, however, five state courts have recog30
nized such equitable authority.
A.

JudicialImmunity: Opening the Door to EquitableJurisdiction

In 1975, Linda Sparkman brought an action in federal court against
Judge Harold D. Stump of the Circuit Court of DeKalb County, Indiana,
alleging violation of her civil rights. Her claim was based on a 1971 ex
parte order by Judge Stump approving Linda's mother's request that
Linda be sterilized. Linda was told at the time that the purpose of the
hospitalization was to remove her appendix. She did not learn of her ster31
ilization until 1975, two years after her marriage.
The district court dismissed Linda's petition on grounds of judicial
immunity. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed on the ground that
Judge Stump, in authorizing the sterilization, had acted without jurisdic426 A.2d at 481-83. Accord, In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981) (adopting standards as
effective law). The Washington court in Haves, while recognizing jurisdiction, was unable to command a majority for adoption of standards. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized jurisdiction, but refused to adopt the standards as positive law. In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307
N.W.2d 881 (198 1) (expressly deferring to the legislature for enunciation of standards).

27. See generally notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra (discussing constitutional requirements).
28. E.g., In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981); see also In re Hayes, 93
Wn. 2d 228, 240-42, 608 P.2d 635, 642-43 (1980) (Stafford, J., concurring).
29. See note 7 supra.
30. In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re A.W., -Colo.-,
637 P.2d 366
(1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d 228,608 P.2d 635
(1980); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).
31. The facts of the case are recited in the opinion of the federal court of appeals, Sparkman v.
McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 173-74 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978).
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tion. 32 Noting the existence in Indiana of a statutory eugenic sterilization
scheme, the court of appeals reasoned that "It]his statutory scheme
clearly negates jurisdiction to consider sterilization in cases not involving
institutionalized persons and in which these procedures are not followed."33 On the basis of what it found to be the majority rule, that
courts lack equity jurisdiction to order a sterilization, 34 the court held that
35
Judge Stump was not immune from civil liability for his action.
The Supreme Court reversed in Stump v. Sparkman,36 holding that the
Seventh Circuit had given the standard of immunity too narrow a construction. It reasoned that the order, for purposes of judicial immunity,
was not made in "clear absence of jurisdiction. ' 37 Hence the Judge's
authorization of the sterilization could not give rise to liability.
Sparkman has little precedential value for purposes of ascertaining
whether a court has equitable jurisdiction to authorize nonconsensual sterilizations. The Court did not decide whether the Indiana court's equitable
powers actually included the right to authorize nonconsensual sterilizations. All the Court decided was that Judge Stump's actions were not so
clearly without jurisdiction that they deprived him of immunity. 38 Despite
this weakness, Sparkman provides a de facto point of departure for the
emerging rule recognizing equitable jurisdiction to authorize the nonconsensual sterilization of mentally retarded persons.
B.

The Pre-SparkmanRule Denying EquitableJurisdiction

The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Sparkman showed confidence that
there was no inherent jurisdiction for Judge Stump's order. 39 Analysis of
the authority cited for this rule demonstrates that this confidence was less
than justified.
The issue of a court's inherent jurisdiction to authorize nonconsensual
sterilization first arose before the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1968 in
32. Id. at 176.
33. Id. at 175.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 176.
36. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
37. Id. at 357.
38. This limitation on the Sparkman holding has been noted by several of the courts concerned
with jurisdiction to order sterilizations. E.g., In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467,480 (1981); In
re Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d 228, 247-48, 608 P.2d 635, 646 (1980) (Rosellini, J., dissenting); see also
Note, supranote 24, at 109 (stating same). But see In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981);
In re Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d 228, 231-32, 608 P.2d 635, 637-38; In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307
N.W.2d 881, 887-88 (1981).
39. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 175-76 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
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Holmes v. Powers.40 In Holmes, a county health officer and a local medical society sought a judicial declaration that they could, without fear of
civil or criminal liability, sterilize a thirty-five year old retarded mother of
two. 4 1 The court declined to make the requested declaration, without dis42
cussing either equitable jurisdiction or the best interests of the woman.
The following year, a similar summary denial of jurisdiction was made by
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Frazier v. Levi. 43 Again, neither
equitable jurisdiction nor the interests of the retarded person were mentioned. 44 Both cases, however, have been repeatedly cited as having established a lack of equitable jurisdiction.45
In 1974 the Missouri Supreme Court handed down its decision in In re
M.K.R. 46 In M.K.R., the court held that the jurisdiction of Missouri's
juvenile courts is not coextensive with that of its courts of general jurisdiction, and thus that the former could not issue an order authorizing sterilization of a retarded person. 47 The court clearly based its holding on the
limited jurisdiction of the juvenile courts rather than any inherent limitation in the jurisdiction of its equity courts. 48 Nonetheless, M.K.R. is often
included among the "majority" denying the equitable jurisdiction of
49
even courts of general equity jurisdiction.
That same year, the California Court of Appeal employed similar reasoning in In re Kemp. 50 The issue in Kemp was whether the statutory
jurisdiction of the probate court included the power to grant sterilization
petitions. 51 Deciding that it did not include this power, the court reasoned
that, since probate courts are not courts of general equitable jurisdiction,
52
all their actions must necessarily be based on specific statutory grants.
These four cases, cited by the Seventh Circuit in Sparkman,53 form the
backbone of the supposedly well-established rule denying equitable juris40. 439S.W.2d579(Ky. 1968).
41.
Id. at 580.
42. See id.
43. 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
44. See id. at 394-95. The court relied extensively on legal encyclopedias in reaching its result
45. See cases cited in note 55 infra.
46. 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974).
47. Id. at 470.
48. Id. There is language in M.K.R. denying the inherent power to authorize sterilizations in
courts of general jurisdiction, and the court cites both the Hohnes and Fraziercases. Id. Inasmuch as
the issue before the court did not concern courts of general jurisdiction, these statements are clearly
dicta.
49. See cases cited in note 55 infra.
50. 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
51. Id. at 760, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
52. Id. at 765, 118 Cal Rptr. at 69.
53. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1977). rev'd sub nona. Stump v. Sparkman. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
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diction. None are good authority. The earlier decisions in Holmes and
Frazier-onean intermediate appellate opinion-deny jurisdiction after
only cursory analysis without discussion of either equitable jurisdiction or
the interests of the retarded person. M.K.R. and Kemp both based their
holdings on a distinction between courts of limited statutory jurisdiction,
which were held to lack authority, and courts of general jurisdiction. The
issue of the effect of a grant of general jurisdiction was not before those

two courts.
Despite the weakness of these precedents, no court prior to Sparkman
had held that a grant of general equitable jurisdiction enabled courts to
authorize nonconsensual sterilizations. Citing the above cases-and obviously concerned about apparent lack of judicial immunity 54-courts
55
summarily developed the "majority" rule denying jurisdiction.
C. EquitableJurisdictionAfter Sparkman
With the cloud of civil liability eliminated by Sparkman, courts were
freed to consider the equitable-jurisdiction issue on its merits. The result
has been a series of carefully reasoned opinions, the majority of which
recognize the inherent authority of courts of general jurisdiction to authorize nonconsensual sterilization. 56 Although these courts agree that they
54. Though the concern of judges with the possibility of personal liability is rarely discussed in
the opinions, it certainly is not far below the surface. See, e.g., Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 764-65,
118 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69. In 1977, before the Supreme Court's reversal of the Seventh Circuit in
Sparkman, the Delaware Chancery Court said:
I am convinced that the procedure prayed for would, under all the circumstances, be in the
best interests of [the individual before the court]. I am, however, faced with the holding of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Sparkman v. McFarlin ....
I disagree with the reasoning of the Circuit Court [in Sparkman] ....
In view of the Sparkman decision, however, and its holding that a judge who orders a sterilization without specific legislative authority is not clothed with judicial immunity, I decline to
enter the proposed order authorizing the sterilization.
In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 145 (Del. Ch. 1977).
55. These four cases are the common thread for the "majority" rule denying equitable jurisdiction. See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. 1979); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 609
(Alaska 1981); In re Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 268 (1978), cert. denied, 440
-Colo.__ , 637 P.2d 366, 376 n.1 (1981) (Lee, J., concurring
U.S. 967 (1979); In re A.W.,
specially); In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 145 (Del. Ch. 1977); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind.-App. 636,
325 N.E.2d 501, 502 (1975); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467, 480 (1981); In re A.D., 90
Misc. 2d 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (Surr. Ct. 1977); In re Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d 228, 231, 608 P.2d
635, 637 (1980); In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 294 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Wis. App. 1980), aff'don
othergrounds, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).
56. Since Stump v. Sparkman was decided in 1978, six courts have decided the equitable jurisdiction issue. Of these, five have recognized jurisdiction based on a general grant. See note 30 and
accompanying text supra. One court, apparently intimidated by the constitutional ramifications of the
issue, refused to recognize equitable jurisdiction. Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979).
See generally notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra(discussing constitutional issues).
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have jurisdiction, they differ on the reasoning used to find that jurisdiction.
1. The "Best Interests" Approach
Of those cases recognizing equitable jurisdiction, the majority base that
jurisdiction simply on the inherent equitable power to act in the best interests of incompetents. 57 This is sometimes characterized as the parens patriae jurisdiction of equity. 58 However denominated, the analysis is a relatively straightforward balancing of this power of the courts against the
right of the individual to procreate. Courts employing this analysis have
enunciated standards intended to protect the right to procreate from the
unwarranted exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
The Washington Supreme Court, in In re Hayes,59 was the first court to
use this reasoning to recognize equitable jurisdiction. After noting the
"majority rule" denying jurisdiction, 60 the Court stated:
These cases are not controlling. Their results are conclusory, as none of
them demonstrates any controlling legal principle prohibiting a court of general jurisdiction from acting upon a petition for sterilization. They suggest
instead a preference that the difficult decisions regarding sterilization be
made by a legislative body. This is not simply a denial of jurisdiction, but
an abdication of the judicial function. We are mindful that a court "cannot
6
escape the demands of judging or of making . . . difficult appraisals." 1
The Hayes court proceeded to infer jurisdiction from the grant of general
equitable jurisdiction in the state constitution. 62 Nevertheless, the court
was unable to reach a consensus on the circumstances under which that
jurisdiction should be exercised. 63 The basis of the court's jurisdiction
64
was simply the best interests of the retarded person.
57.

See li re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re Hayes. 93 Wn. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635

(1980);In re Eberhardy. 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981).
58. In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607.610-12 (Alaska 1981);In re Hayes. 93 Wn. 2d 228,233.608
P.2d 635, 638 (1980).
59. 93 Wn.2d 228,608 P.2d 635 (1980).
60. Id. at 231, 608 P.2d at 637.
61. Id. (quoting Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1973)).
62. Id. at 234, 608 P.2d at 639. This grant of general jurisdiction is contained in WASH. CONST.

art.
IV,§ 6.
63. As noted, a majority of the Hayes court recognized jurisdiction. A four-justice plurality proceeded to provide standards for the exercise of jurisdiction. See 93 Wn. 2d at 234-40. 608 P.2d at
639-42. See generally note 25 supra (summarizing the plurality's proposed standards). Two Justices, though recognizing jurisdiction (and thus providing a majority on at least that issue), would
have deferred to the legislature for standards of exercise. Id. at 240-42, 608 P.2d at 642-43 (Stafford, J., concurring). Three justices, seemingly unable to distinguish between eugenic and equitable
sterilization, dissented even from the recognition of jurisdiction. Id. at 242-49. 608 P.2d at 643-46
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2.

The "Rights" Analysis

In 1981 the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized its equitable jurisdiction to authorize sterilizations in In re Grady.65 In affirming the lower
court's grant of the petition of the parents to sterilize their twenty-yearold daughter, who was afflicted with Down's Syndrome, the court based
its holding on analysis of the rights of the individual before the court. The
court first recognized that any authorization is potentially a violation of
the right to procreate, which is recognized as "fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race." 66 It then noted the abuses of sterilization as a tool of eugenic policy, 67 and expressly disavowed eugenic theory. 68
The court distinguished the facts before it from both voluntary and
compulsory sterilization on the ground that, rather than having expressed
a desire not to be sterilized, the individual here was simply incapable of
indicating her wish either way. 6 9 More significantly, however, the Grady
court next examined the U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing with privacy and contraception, 70 and concluded that those decisions support a
broad personal right to control contraception, which includes an affirmative constitutional right to voluntary sterilization. 7 1 Coupled with the
(Rosellini, J., dissenting). See generally Note, Sterilization of Mental Incompetents, 16 GONZ. L.
REv'. 465 (1981) (noting Hayes).
64. 93 Wn. 2d at 232-34, 608 P.2d at 638-39. The same approach was taken by the courts in In
re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981), and In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881
(1981).
65. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). The rights-based approach of the Grady court was recently followed by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re A.W.,
Colo..,
637 P.2d 366
(1981).
66. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d at 472 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942)).
67. Id., 426A.2dat472-73.
68. Id., 426 A.2d at 473 n.3.
69. In the words of the court:
The case before us presents a situation that is difficult to characterize as either "compulsory"
or "voluntary." "Compulsory" would refer to a sterilization that the state imposes despite objections by the person to be sterilized or one who represents his interests. Here, however, Lee
Ann's parents and her guardian ad litem all agree that sterilization is in her best interests, and
while the state may be acting in the constitutional sense, it would not be compelling sterilization.
Lee Ann herself can comprehend neither the problem nor the proposed solution; without any
such understanding it is difficult to say that sterilization would be against her will. Yet for this
same reason, the label "voluntary" is equally inappropriate. Since Lee Ann is without the capacity for giving informed consent, any explanation of the proposed sterilization could only
mislead her. Thus, what is proposed for Lee Ann is best described as neither "compulsory" nor
"voluntary," but as lacking personal consent because of a legal disability.
Id., 426 A.2d at 473.
70. See generally note 15 supra(citing these cases).
71. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d at 473-74; cf. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978)
(statute providing for sterilization of institutionalized persons denies equal protection to those not
institutionalized).
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right to be free from nonconsensual bodily invasions, the individual thus
has a choice of which right to exercise.
The Grady court then reasoned that, in order for this choice to be
meaningful, an individual's incompetence should not be allowed to prevent its exercise. Relying on In re Quinlan 72 and the equitable parens
patriae jurisdiction of the courts, the Grady court recognized judicial
power to make that choice in instances where limited mental capacity has
73
rendered meaningless a person's own right to choose.
1II.

ANALYSIS

Courts of general equitable jurisdiction should have inherent authority
to order the sterilization of mentally handicapped persons where the welfare of the person before the court so dictates. If the exercise of such
jurisdiction is expressly limited by stringent standards 74 to insure against
violating fundamental rights, 75 there is no reason to deny this remedy
with one hand while allowing other, equally drastic remedies with the
other. 76 Disallowing this particular remedy under these circumstances
would truly be to make equity equal to the length of the chancellor's foot.
72. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied. 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The Quinlan case. which
gained national publicity, involved Karen Ann Quinlan. who was comatose following the use of
incompatible drugs. In authorizing the disconnection of life support machines. the court, after finding
a constitutional right in the dependent person to disconnect them herself, allowed Karen's parents to
exercise that right.
73. 85 N.J. 235,426A.2dat475.
74. The standards proposed by the New Jersey court in Grady and the Washington court in Haves
are summarized in note 25 supra.
75. See generally notes 15-17 supra (citing cases setting forth the relevant constitutional standards).
76. As noted by the Supreme Court of Alaska:
The question of a court's jurisdiction goes to its power to hear and adjudicate the subject
matter in a given case. . . . Where a court is one of general jurisdiction, such as the superior
court in the case at bar, it has traditionally been regarded as having the power to hear all controversies which may be brought before a court within the legal bounds of rights or remedies.
except insofar as has been expressly and unequivocally denied by the state's constitution or
statutes . ..
Subsequent cases have clearly established that the doctrine of parenspatriaejurisdiction also
extends to those difficult cases where the court must decide on behalf of an incompetent whether
or not to consent to shock treatment, chemotherapy treatment, amputation, medication, and the
removal of artificial life support mechanisms. We see no reason why the superior court's inherent parens patriaejurisdiction should not apply as well, to a petition for the sterilization of an
incompetent. Indeed, to ignore this well-settled doctrine in favor of the so-called majority rule
would amount to nothing less than an abdication of our judicial responsibilties. leaving C.D.M.
and her parents without any means of recourse. Although we recognize that this petition, and
others like it,
present many troublesome questions, we are also "mindful that a court 'cannot
escape the demands ofjudging or of making . . . difficult appraisals.' "
In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607. 610-11 (Alaska 1981) (footnotes & citations omitted) (quoting 1I re
Hayes. 93 Wn. 2d 228. 231, 608 P.2d 635. 637 (1980)).
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More importantly, however, if courts lack equitable jurisdiction in this
area, they will be unable to provide a remedy where traditional notions of
77
equity would dictate that they should.
Eugenic sterilization is based on an archaic theory of questionable validity, and its statutory implementation is of doubtful constitutionality. 78
It is undeniable, though, that the embodiment of eugenic theory involves
a social policy judgment. Such a judgment easily qualifies as a legislative
concern that should be beyond any inherent judicial jurisdiction. Equitably justified sterilization, however, involves only the welfare of the person before the court. Within this limitation, sterilization is clearly within
the scope of traditional equity jurisdiction. As noted by the Washington
court in Hayes, the failure to recognize this jurisdiction is an abdication of
79
judicial responsibility.
The rationale employed in recognizing equitable jurisdiction should be,
however, as narrow as possible. This is true for two reasons. First, too
broad an assertion of jurisdiction, in light of the pre-Sparkmnan cases and
the present disrepute of eugenic theory, sets the stage for charges of judicial legislation. 80 Second, since the contemplated remedy necessarily implicates fundamental rights, 8 1jurisdiction should be based as narrowly as
possible to prevent violation of those rights. 82 For these reasons, the
rights-based analysis in Grady is preferable to the "best interest" reasoning of Hayes.
The Hayes approach and the constitutional analysis of eugenics in Buck
v. Bell are strongly analogous. In both instances, the issue is assumed to
be a simple balance between the right of an individual to be free from
nonconsensual sterilization and the power of the courts either to compel 83
that sterilization or to authorize it in the person's best interest. 84 The failure to adequately distinguish between the rationales of eugenics and equi77. A good example of a case where equity should intervene is Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp.
361 (D. Conn. 1978), which involved the parents' petition for the sterilization of three sisters, all of
whom were severely retarded, blind, and deaf.
78. See notes 4-17 and accompanying text supra.
79. 93 Wn. 2d at 231-34, 608 P.2d at 637-39.
80. See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979); Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d at 240-48, 608 P.2d
at 642-46 (Stafford, J., concurring & Rosellini, J., dissenting); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539,
307 N.W.2d 881, 895-99 (1981).
81. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
82. Id.; see In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 611 (Alaska 1981); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539,
307 N.W.2d 881, 905-11 (Day, J., dissenting).
83. It is only in the context of a statute that any question of compulsion is ever raised. A basic
assumption of the equitable theory is that the individual is unable to consent, and thus no issue of
compulsion is raised. See lt re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467, 473 (198 1); In re Hayes, 93 Wn.
2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
84. Note that this dichotomy of individual rights versus the power of the state acting through its
courts is also assumed in those cases constituting the "majority" rule.
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table jurisdiction hopelessly split the Hayes court85 and has caused strong
dissent in others. 86 Moreover, posturing the analysis in terms of this simple balancing does not provide an adequate basis to distinguish the preSparkman "majority" rule. 87 The opinions forming that rule likewise relied on a simple analysis balancing individual rights against the power of
the state, acting through its courts, to authorize nonconsensual sterilizations. In declining to follow those cases, courts adopting the "best interest" rationale simply come down the other way, without changing the
reasoning.
The rights-based analysis of Grady, however, is not subject to these
criticisms. Assertion of equitable jurisdiction to exercise an incompetent's right to control procreation is clearly distinguishable from the rationale underlying the eugenic analysis of the Supreme Court in Buck v.
Bell. This distinction meets many of the objections to equitable jurisdiction based on charges of judicial legislation. 88 Moreover, the Grady reasoning provides a ready basis for rejecting the "majority" rule's denial of
jurisdiction. The rationale in support of the jurisdiction asserted in Grady
is clearly much narrower than that which was rejected by the pre-Sparkman cases but accepted by the post-Sparkman "best interest" cases. Under both the "majority" rule and the "best interests" approach, the
power to sterilize is based squarely and solely on the equitable powers of
courts of general jurisdiction, and either accepted or rejected on that
basis. In Grady, however, the power to sterilize is based not just on the
jurisdiction of the court, but on the right of the individual herself. Equitable jurisdiction is invoked only to give meaning to that right in a context
where it would otherwise be meaningless.
The Grady reasoning also has practical advantages over the "best interests" approach. In the latter, standards are generally adopted in order
to give content to the amorphous "best interest" characterization. 89
These have been strict and specific, and rightfully so. The reasoning of
the "best interest" cases, however, provides less guidance to trial courts
charged with equitable jurisdiction than that provided under the rights
analysis. When a judgment call in interpreting the standards arises-as it
necessarily will when courts must decide whether to authorize a sterilization-there is nothing more than the "best interest" characterization as a
85. See note 63 supra.
86. E.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 614-16 (Alaska 1981) (Matthews, J.. dissenting): Il re
Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881, 899-905 (1981) (Coffey, J., dissenting).
87. See generatly notes 40-55 and accompanying text supra (discussing cases constituting the
"majority" rule).
88. See generally note 80 supra (citing cases where this objection has been made).
89. See, e.g.. In re Hayes, 93 Wn. 2d 228, 234, 608 P.2d 635. 639 (1980). The standards are
discussed in note 25 supra.
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guide to decision. Under Grady, however, the theoretical context is concrete: the court is to employ the standards to decide if intervention is necessary to give meaning to the individual's right to control her procreation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Though formerly accepted as sound policy, statutory eugenic sterilization schemes have fallen into general disrepute and are disappearing from
the books. 90 Confronted with petitions for sterilization in a different context, courts, perhaps with a watchful eye on the possibility of civil liability, summarily refused to discuss the issue and developed a rule denying
any independent jurisdiction to authorize sterilization. Since the veil of
judicial immunity was restored, however, courts have rightfully refused
to "throw the baby out with the bath water," and have recognized equitable jurisdiction to authorize sterilization of mentally handicapped persons
in very limited circumstances. This is as it should be, provided the scope
of the jurisdiction asserted is as narrow as possible, its exercise furthers
the rights of the retarded person, and its applicability is strictly limited by
standards consistent with the equitable nature of the remedy.
CraigL. Mclvor

90. See note 6 supra;see also R. Burgdorf & M. Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch Is Almost Dead:
Buck v. Bell and the Sterilizationof HandicappedPersons,50 T,.
L.Q. 995 (1977).

